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Does the Human Right to Freedom of Conscience, 
Religion, and Belief Have Special Status? 
David Little ∗  
I. INTRODUCTION 
Renewed controversy surrounds the status of Article 18, as it ap-
pears both in the Universal Declaration1 and in the International 
Covenant of Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR),2 because of the 
unanimous adoption by the United States Congress of the Interna-
tional Religious Freedom Act of 1998 (IRFA).3 Considerable con-
cern was expressed during the period of drafting and debate over 
that bill as to whether the United States, in embracing such legisla-
tion, intended to single out and give special priority to religious 
freedom.4 By requiring the President and other U.S. officials to exert 
extra effort in support of the right of religious freedom around the 
world, does the legislation imply that that right has a higher—or at 
least different—status from other human rights? 
While the United States is apparently trying to elevate this right, 
some other governments are urging extreme caution, if not opposi-
tion, to promoting religious freedom. These governments, and pub-
licists sympathetic to their cause, fear that American policy, in its 
new-found exuberance, will ignore—and at times unfairly subvert—
the particular historical experience of others and the delicate place 
religion occupies in each nation’s peculiar identity. What religious  
 
 
 ∗ Professor, Harvard Divinity School. Professor Little is the former Director of the 
U.S. Institute for Peace and is currently a member of the International Academy for the Free-
dom of Religion and Belief. 
 1. See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 
U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948). 
 2. See International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature Dec. 
16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171. 
 3. See International Religious Freedom Act of 1998, 22 U.S.C. § 6401 et seq. (2000). 
 4. Because it is cumbersome to keep referring to “freedom of conscience, religion, and 
belief,” the phrase “religious freedom” occasionally is used for shorthand. The other two ideas 
are decidedly implied. See infra note 9 (indicating why “freedom of thought,” a term also in-
cluded in Article 18, should be seen in a different light from the other three ideas). 
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freedom means in one national context may be altogether different 
from what it means in another. 
In other words, religious freedom is just now the subject of in-
tense international debate, usually described as a controversy over 
“cultural relativism,” or what my colleague Samuel Huntington calls 
“the clash of civilizations.”5 The assumption of those espousing the 
relativist view is that the world is made up of distinct, self-contained, 
and conflicting units of culture or civilization. It is supposed to fol-
low from this assumption that notions of human rights, including 
rights to religious freedom, vary according to culture and tradition. 
They are not readily translatable from one setting to another. This 
prompts a pointed question: How does the United States, which is 
only one country among many, have the authority, by means of 
IRFA or anything else, to impose on others its particular view of the 
meaning of religious freedom? 
In response, I want to raise and comment on two questions re-
garding the status of the right to freedom of conscience, religion, 
and belief. One is the status of that right within the corpus of inter-
national human rights as well as in Western history. This is essentially 
a descriptive, empirical matter. The second question concerns the 
status of this right from the perspective of world opinion. Here we 
are concerned with normative issues: whether the right to religious 
freedom is properly regarded as universally applicable in the same 
way that at least some other human rights are, such as prohibitions 
against extrajudicial killing, torture, enslavement, etc. 
II. LEGAL AND HISTORICAL STATUS OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 
As to the relation of religious freedom to other human rights, it 
seems clear that existing human rights documents and recent inter-
national jurisprudence do give the right to religious freedom a cer-
tain kind of special status. The documents themselves elevate that 
right in some interesting ways. Recall that the right to religious free-
dom is, with some limitations, included among the nonderogable 
rights contained in Article 4 of the ICCPR. That fact itself suggests 
that freedom of conscience, religion, and belief is intended to be 
thought of as among the most sacred or most fundamental of the 
universally recognized human rights. Of course, it is not the only 
 
 5. See SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, THE CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS AND THE REMAKING 
OF THE WORLD ORDER (1996). 
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right so designated. Article 4 also stipulates that protections from ra-
cial, religious, gender, and other forms of discrimination, as well as 
the prohibition against arbitrary killing, torture, enslavement, etc., 
are also nonderogable. 
To be sure, the limitations on the freedom to “manifest one’s re-
ligion or belief” in regard to “public safety, order, health, or morals 
or the fundamental freedoms and rights of others,” mentioned in 
paragraph 3 of Article 18 of the ICCPR, also obtain in Article 4. At 
the same time, recent authoritative interpretation of Article 18 by the 
Human Rights Committee attaches some important qualifications 
that narrow the application of paragraph 3.6 
First, the freedom to hold or admit to any theistic, nontheistic, 
or atheistic belief or to refrain from holding or admitting to any such 
belief is, and remains, absolute. Governments and others are com-
pletely prohibited from compelling or punishing belief as such. 
“Manifestation” would appear to mean public advocacy or the ex-
pressing of belief in the form of overt behavior. Only activity of that 
sort is properly subject to limitation. Second, the state bears the bur-
den of showing that any restrictions on religious freedom are “di-
rectly related and proportionate to the specific need on which they 
are predicated.”7 Third, the limitations clause may not be adminis-
tered in a discriminatory fashion. That means that all fundamental 
beliefs must be treated without preference or prejudice. It also means 
that when authorities impose restrictions on the manifestation of re-
ligious or other basic beliefs by appealing to “morals,” they must 
take into account “many social, philosophical and religious tradi-
tions” and not rely on principles “deriving exclusively from a single 
tradition.”8 In short, the Human Rights Committee is aware of the 
possible abuses to which the limitations clause of Article 18 might be 
susceptible and sensibly moves to narrow the range of potential mis-
use. 
Moreover, it is important to remember that Article 18 includes 
three discrete terms: “conscience,” “religion,” and “belief.” We shall 
single out the idea of conscience presently, but, before doing that, 
 
 6. See UNITED NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITTEE GENERAL COMMENT NO. 22 
(48), U.N. Human Rights Committee, ¶¶ 1, 2, 3, 8, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.4 
(1993), reprinted in RELIGION AND HUMAN RIGHTS: BASIC DOCUMENTS 92–95 (Tad Stah-
nke & J. Paul Martin eds., 1998). 
 7. Id. ¶ 8. 
 8. Id. 
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let us emphasize another aspect of the special status that the Human 
Rights Committee extends to the right of freedom of conscience, re-
ligion, and belief. According to the committee, “the [ICCPR] does 
not explicitly refer to a right of conscientious objection, but . . . such 
a right can be derived from Article 18, inasmuch as the obligation to 
use lethal force may seriously conflict with freedom of conscience 
and the right to manifest one’s religion or belief.”9 This is a pro-
found pronouncement for two reasons. First, some fundamental be-
liefs, even those enjoining otherwise illegal forms of behavior such as 
refraining from military conscription, are entitled, as a matter of 
right, to special deference. Second, the pronouncement incisively 
calls attention to the problematic character of the relation of force 
and fundamental belief. To be compelled against one’s conscience, 
religion, or belief to use force in military service may reasonably ap-
pear as objectionable as employing force to compel belief itself. The 
arresting implication of the committee’s opinion is that being forced 
against one’s basic convictions to use force is a severe violation of the 
right of conscience, religion, and belief. (This special connection also 
serves, usefully, to narrow the range of actions exemptible on 
grounds of conscience, etc.) 
Beyond these textual and jurisprudential references, there are ad-
ditional historical reasons for assigning some kind of special status to 
religious freedom. Article 18, paragraph 2 of the ICCPR states that 
“No one shall be subject to coercion which would impair [one’s] 
freedom to have or to adopt a religion or belief of [one’s] choice.” 
This implies an opposition between coercion and fundamental belief 
that lies deep within the Western tradition from which formulations 
of this sort have emerged. That opposition was highlighted by the 
twelfth century, when the age-old distinction between forum inter-
num and forum externum took on new prominence and saliency in 
European life. At that time, the idea of an internal tribunal, under-
stood as the conscience, was assigned special sovereignty and protec-
 
 9. Id. ¶ 11. Notice that the committee here refers only to “conscience” or “religion or 
belief” in reference to a right to conscientious objection and not to “freedom of thought” 
(which is also mentioned in Article 18). It is unlikely that that omission is accidental. It would 
appear that “thought” is a much more inclusive category than “conscience, religion, and be-
lief.” The latter seems to refer to a quite narrow and select range of “thought,” namely, certain 
fundamental convictions that occupy an especially important and potent place in the life of any 
individual. It is these, and not “thought” in general—however protected it may also be—that 
yields a special exemption like a right of conscientious objection. 
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tion, as a matter of “natural right,” over and against the external tri-
bunal or civil authority.10 The phrase “sovereignty of conscience” 
conveys the basic understanding that the civil authority is ultimately 
in business, so to speak, to defend and encourage the rights of con-
science, religion, and belief. To be sure, these notions were subject, 
subsequently, to various and variable interpretations. Nevertheless, 
to conclude that the forum externum owes special deference and spe-
cial forms of exemption to the forum internum, as has the Human 
Rights Committee, is perfectly consistent with the underlying as-
sumptions. Indeed, one way to think about a crucial implication re-
garding the state’s responsibility, namely, the enforcement of rights 
against murder, theft, libel, and other forms of arbitrary injury, is 
that such protection is a necessary condition for the exercise of con-
science, religion, and belief. If individuals were not protected against 
violence and abuse of that sort, they would not be free—they would 
not enjoy the “sovereignty”—to pursue and work out the fundamen-
tal beliefs that make them who they are. 
Incidentally, the whole idea of the sovereignty of conscience is 
very important in the formative period of United States history. The 
thoughts of individuals like Thomas Jefferson and James Madison 
eventually exerted considerable influence on existing human rights 
understanding. There is much to be said here. Let us be satisfied 
with an eloquent quotation from Jefferson: “[O]ur rulers can have 
no authority over such natural rights, only as we have submitted to 
them. The rights of conscience we never submitted, we could not 
submit.”11 It follows that to surrender to “our rulers” the “inalien-
able” rights of the internal forum would be tantamount to 
surrendering the core of the human personality. 
III. RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND WORLD OPINION 
Regarding the universal applicability of the right of conscience, 
religion, and belief, two things may be said. First, on inspection, we 
live in a world dominated not so much by a clash as by a confusion 
of civilizations. Contrary to the claims of cultural relativists and oth-
 
 10. See Brian Tierney, Religious Rights: An Historical Perspective, in RELIGIOUS HUMAN 
RIGHTS IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE: RELIGIOUS PERSPECTIVES 17, 26–30 (John Witte, Jr. & 
Johan D. van der Vyver eds., 1996). 
 11. Thomas Jefferson, Notes on Virginia, in THE LIFE AND SELECTED WRITINGS OF 
THOMAS JEFFERSON 185, 274–75 (Adrienne Koch & William Peden eds., 1944). 
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ers that our world is divided up into distinct, self-contained, and 
conflicting units of culture or civilization, things are much more 
complicated and convoluted. In reality, there is no one Asian view, 
no one Islamic or European view, just as there is no one American 
view, of how rights, or anything else, ought to be interpreted and 
applied. Far from being unified and harmonious, cultures and civili-
zations are dynamic and fluid affairs, particularly under the influence 
of modern information technology. They are arenas of contention 
and controversy. Which version of “official culture” becomes domi-
nant typically depends not on the result of informed and deliberative 
national consensus, but on the strength and influence of particular 
political and economic factions. 
Ours is an age of nationalism where there is a strong impulse on 
the part of state authorities to ally themselves with one, often a ma-
jority, ethnoreligious group so as to create a national faith considered 
essential for political identity. The problem is that dissenters and mi-
norities are left out. They are not treated according to the norms of 
nondiscrimination and freedom of conscience, religion, and belief 
enshrined in the human rights documents. On the contrary, they are 
regularly suppressed or punished as deviant and disloyal for no other 
reason than that they refuse to espouse or identify with the dominant 
faith. 
This state of affairs explains the deficiencies of the cultural rela-
tivist position, as well as why the new emphasis on the freedom of 
conscience, religion, and belief is so relevant. Cultural relativists, in a 
word, have no place for minorities. A leading feature of modern in-
ternational politics is the widespread existence of minorities. The 
radical problems they pose for dominant majorities readily defy and 
disprove the popular image of a world composed of monolithic, 
harmonious cultures or civilizations. 
That is also why the right of religious freedom has such power 
throughout the world. Minorities recognize, in ways that majorities 
often do not, the urgency of protecting dissent and deviance. There-
fore, minorities, and those who support them, frequently champion 
the rights of the dispossessed and disadvantaged, including the right 
to espouse and practice (within limits) the dictates of one’s funda-
mental beliefs. In fact, there is new, compelling evidence that, 
among other things, human rights standards designed to protect the  
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religious and cultural independence of minorities are beginning to 
have a positive effect.12 
According to the recent findings of Gurr and associates, the “first 
and most basic” reason for the improvement of the treatment of mi-
norities and the decline of ethnopolitical conflict worldwide is “the 
recognition and active protection of the rights of minority peoples: 
freedom from discrimination based on race, national origin, lan-
guage, or religion, complemented by institutional means to protect 
and promote collective interests,” implying “the right of national 
peoples to exercise some degree of autonomy within existing states 
to govern their own affairs.”13 
The second thing to be said on behalf of the universal applicabil-
ity of the right to the freedom of conscience, religion, and belief is 
what we might call “the lesson of fascism.” The fundamental reason 
the world embraced human rights after World War II was not be-
cause people suddenly became enamored of liberal philosophy or 
even because of the postwar dominance of the United States. The 
primary reason was the moral revulsion worldwide to the indisput-
able atrocities perpetrated in the name of fascism, in both its Euro-
pean and Asian versions. 
A key feature of fascism was the direct assault on the right of 
conscience, religion, and belief. Those who, for whatever reason, 
questioned the national faith, who dissented from the collective 
myth, were automatically branded as subversives and thus became 
the fitting target of suppression and/or elimination. Their primary 
sin was to fail to believe in the theory of collective domination. The 
crucial part of the lesson of fascism is that it violated religious free-
dom along with the whole range of other rights now understood to 
be requisite for human fulfillment. Denial of the right of conscience, 
religion, or belief, it appears, seldom occurs in isolation. 
 
 12. See, e.g., TED ROBERT GURR, PEOPLES VERSUS STATES: MINORITIES AT RISK IN 
THE NEW CENTURY 275 (2000). Gurr states: 
The breakup of the international system into warring ethnic statelets, which many 
feared in the early 1990s, has been checked by more effective international and do-
mestic strategies for managing ethnopolitical conflict. Relations between [ethnic] 
groups and states in heterogeneous societies changed in the 1990s in ways that sug-
gest that a new regime governing minority-majority relations is under construction. 
Id. 
 13. Id. at 278. 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
We may conclude both that the freedom of conscience, religion, 
and belief does enjoy a certain special status legally and historically 
and that it ought to enjoy such a status in the court of world opinion. 
At the same time, we should emphasize that the freedom of religion 
is part of a wider bundle of rights. To support freedom of con-
science, religion, and belief requires the enforcement of rights 
against murder, torture, enslavement, and the whole host of other 
human rights that weave together into a fabric of protection essential 
to clothe human life with dignity. To single out and promote reli-
gious freedom in isolation from other human rights would be as mis-
taken as to deny the distinctive status of that right. 
